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Abstract
In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption
and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our notion of subsistence
allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and
prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of one of the goods at certain
consumption bundles. For subsistence, the irrelevance is induced by the subsis-
tence requirement and for generalized Leontief, it is induced by complementarity.
We capture this difference using the notion of unhappy sets.
JEL Classifications: D11, O12, O15
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1 Introduction
Subsistence is the minimum amount of basic necessities essential for a person’s survival.
Depending on the context, it can be expressed alternatively in terms of income (e.g.,
$1.25 per day) or in terms of nutrition such as a certain daily calorie requirement. It
forms the basis of poverty measurements: “...absolute poverty lines are often based on
estimates of the cost of basic food needs (i.e., the cost a nutritional basket considered
minimal for the healthy survival of a typical family), to which a provision is added for
non-food needs.” (World Bank, 2013). As extreme poverty and hunger continue to pose
a major global challenge, subsistence remains a useful concept for policymakers. For
instance, effective policies to end hunger require knowledge of not only the number of
hungry people, but also their food deficit or the depth of hunger, which is measured by
“comparing the average amount of dietary energy that undernourished people get from
the foods they eat with the minimum amount of dietary energy they need to maintain
body weight and undertake light activity.” (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, 2014).
∗Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India
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The Stone-Geary utility function is widely used to model subsistence.1 However,
under this utility function a consumer is compelled to consume above the subsistence
level, thus assuming away the problem of poor people. Moreover the level of subsistence
is assumed to be the same across individuals. This is also unrealistic as subsistence
requirement does depend on factors such as age, gender, habitat and physical charac-
teristics (see, e.g., Svedberg [11], Jensen and Miller [3]).
This paper seeks to provide a micro-foundation of subsistence consumption in a con-
sumer theory framework. We axiomatize subsistence consumption in a setting where
an individual makes consumption choices over two goods: a basic good which is a ne-
cessity such as food and a non-basic good which can represent a composite of other
commodities.2 In developing our theory, we appeal to two distinct aspects of a basic
necessity. First, a minimum critical level of this good is required for the individual.
This is the subsistence requirement. The other commodities can benefit the individ-
ual only if the consumption of the basic good exceeds the subsistence requirement.
The second aspect is saturation. Once the individual has consumed sufficiently large
amounts of the basic good, consuming more of it is of no benefit.3
Observe that subsistence and saturation generate irrelevance of one of the goods.
The non-basic good is irrelevant when the subsistence requirement is not met, while
the basic good becomes irrelevant when its saturation is reached. Incorporating these
features, we define a preference with the subsistence requirement which we call the
subsistence induced irrelevance (SII) preference. For such preferences there are three
zones in the commodity space. Apart from the two zones where one of the goods is
irrelevant, there is an intermediate region (where the consumption of the basic good
has exceeded the subsistence level but not yet reached saturation) in which none of the
goods is irrelevant. In this region the individual has a standard consumer preference
where two goods can be imperfectly substitutable. SII preferences thus enrich consumer
theory by allowing for the existence of poverty and prosperity in different regions of the
commodity space. Furthermore, in contrast to the Stone-Geary utility function, these
preferences allow for different levels of subsistence across individuals. In Theorem 1 we
axiomatize SII preferences.
Irrelevance of a good in SII preferences is induced by subsistence and saturation.
However, irrelevance can also be induced by complementarity between the two goods.
If an individual prefers two spoons of sugar with every cup of tea and has one cup of tea,
then sugar becomes irrelevant after two spoons. For such preferences (called Leontief
preferences), complementarity between the goods implies that at any consumption
bundle one of the two goods is irrelevant. Theorem 2 axiomatizes a generalized version
of the Leontief preference (GL preferences).
Apart from the notion of irrelevance, the other key concept that is central for our
1Rebelo [6] and Steger [10]) use the Stone-Geary function to study the role of subsistence in
economic growth. See Sharif [9] for a survey of measurement issues of subsistence. Subsistence
consumption has also been associated with Giffen behavior, i.e., upward sloping demand curve (see,
e.g., Jensen and Miller [2]).
2Jensen and Miller [3] also consider a two-good setting to study subsistence behavior. However,
both goods in their model are basic goods (food items that contribute calories) and there is substi-
tutability among them.
3We use a weaker notion of saturation in our model.
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axiomatizations is an unhappy set. A set of consumption bundles is said to be an
unhappy set if every bundle outside this set is preferred to all bundles inside the set.
This captures the state of a poor person who has extreme urge to come out of poverty.
To see how the notions of irrelevance and unhappy sets are connected in our axioms,
call a set of consumption bundles irrelevant in a certain good if that good is irrelevant at
all bundles of the set. For SII preferences, the zone where the subsistence requirement
is not met is the largest unhappy set that is irrelevant in the non-basic good. But for
GL preferences, if a set is irrelevant in any good, it can never be an unhappy set. Thus
roughly speaking, SII and GL preferences are characterized by the presence or absence
of unhappiness in irrelevance. It is a case of too little versus too much. Irrelevance
of the non-basic good in SII preference stems from the fact that there is too little of
the basic good. For GL preference, irrelevance of a good is driven by too much of that
good in relation to the other good.
Conceptually unhappy sets are closely related to the notion of ‘strong external insta-
bility’ of von-Neumann and Morgenstern [12]. To see this define a set of consumption
bundles to be a happy set if for any bundle outside this set we can find a bundle in
this set which is preferred to it. Thus, a happy set is that set of bundles that are
externally stable. So a set is not happy set if there exists a commodity bundle outside
this set which is at least as good as all bundles in this set. Our definition of unhappy
set strengthens this notion of not happy set since we require that each bundle in an
unhappy set is dominated (not just weakly but strictly) by all bundles outside the set
(and not just by one bundle outside this set).
To the best of our knowledge subsistence requirement has never been incorporated in
the preference based approach of consumer behavior. One can find an axiomatization of
the lexicographic preferences in Fishburn [1]. Milnor [5] axiomatizes the max, min and
sum criteria. Maskin [4] provides a characterization of the sum and max-min criteria
and also relaxes the continuity assumption to provide characterizations of lexicographic
max-min and lexicographic max-max criteria. Segal and Sobel [8] characterize the min
and max criteria and their combination with sum criteria. The main difference of our
approach from the above mentioned literature is that our axioms are on the regions of
irrelevance embedded in SII and GL preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. After providing the preliminaries in Section 2
we define SII preferences and discuss some implications of the notion of irrelevance.
Axiomatization of SII preferences is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we present
axiomatization of GL preferences.
2 Preliminaries
Consider the problem of an agent in a two-good economy where the set of goods is
{1, 2}. The agent has a consumption set X = X1 ×X2 where Xi = R+ for i ∈ {1, 2},
and X = R2+. A consumption bundle is x = (x1, x2) ∈ X where xi stands for the
amount of good i. Generic points in X will be denoted by x, y, z. If for i ∈ {1, 2}: (a)
xi > yi, then we say x > y, (b) xi ≥ yi, then x ≥ y and (c) xi = yi, then x = y.
The agent’s preference on X is defined using the binary relation “at least as good
as”. We say x ∈ X is at least as good as y ∈ X and write it as x % y. The preference
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relation % on X is rational (i.e., complete and transitive).4 The strict preference is
defined as x  y ⇔ [x % y] and not[y % x]. The indifference relation is defined
as x ∼ y ⇔ [x % y] and [y % x]. The preference relation % on X is continuous
if {(xn, yn)} is a sequence of pairs of elements in X such that xn % yn for all n
and limn→∞ xn = x, limn→∞ yn = y, then x % y. The preference relation % on X is
monotone if for any x, y ∈ X such that x > y, x  y.
Axiom 0 The preference relation % on X = R2+ is rational, continuous and monotone.
Throughout the paper we shall assume that Axiom 0 holds, so it will not be stated
separately in the ensuing statements.
2.1 SII preferences
Definition 1 We say good 2 is irrelevant at a bundle x if x ∼ (x1, y2) for all y2 > x2.
Similarly good 1 is irrelevant at a bundle x if x ∼ (y1, x2) for all y1 > x1. A good is
relevant at a bundle x if it is not irrelevant there.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. We say that a bundle y involves xi if yi = xi. Thus, the
set of all bundles involving xi is {y ∈ X|yi = xi, yj ∈ R+}.
Definition 2 The preference relation % on X is a subsistence induced irrelevance
preference (or an SII preference) with respect to good 1 if it satisfies the following
properties.
(I) Subsistence: ∃ Q ∈ (0,∞) such that
(a) Subsistence zone [0, Q]: if x1 ∈ [0, Q], then good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles
involving x1;
(b) Non-subsistence zone (Q,∞): if x1 > Q, then ∃ y1 ∈ (Q, x1) such that good
2 is relevant at some bundle involving y1.
(II) Weak saturation: ∃ x2 ∈ X2 and Q ∈ R+ such that good 1 is irrelevant at x if
x1 ≥ Q and it is relevant at x if x1 < Q.
Definition 2 has zones of subsistence and weak saturation in preferences. In this
definition good 1 is the basic good which is a necessity and Q stands for the subsistence
threshold. Good 2 is the non-basic good. For instance, if good 1 represents food, then
Q stands for the amount of food that gives the minimum daily calorie requirements
for the individual. The subsistence zone specifies that if the consumption of good 1 is
below this critical level, then consumption of good 2 does not have any benefit (property
I(a)). The non-basic good is beneficial to the consumer provided the consumption of
the basic good exceeds the threshold level Q (property I(b)). Property (II) of the
definition specifies another threshold Q of the basic good 1, beyond which it has no
benefit to the consumer. This captures the saturation aspect of a standard basic good
like food item.
4The preference relation % on X is complete if for any x, y ∈ X, either x % y or y % x or both. It
is transitive if for any x, y, z ∈ X, [x % y and y % z]⇒ x % z.
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The SII preference has two implications that are stated in Observation 1. First,
there is a natural order between the threshold of subsistence and saturation (that is,
Q ≤ Q). Second, if the amount of the basic good exceeds the saturation level (that
is, x1 > Q), then the non-basic good is necessarily beneficial. Formally, call a subset
S ⊆ X1 a strong non-subsistence zone if whenever x1 ∈ S, then good 2 is relevant at
some bundle involving x1. We show that the interval (Q,∞) is indeed a strong non-
subsistence zone, that is if x1 > Q, then good 2 is relevant at some bundle involving
x1.
Observation 1 For any SII preference Q ≤ Q, with strict inequality if x2 > 0 in (II).
Moreover, the weak saturation property implies that the interval (Q,∞) is a strong
non-subsistence zone.
2.2 Irrelevance: some implications
We define two functions f1, f2 : X → {0, 1} that captures the notion of irrelevance.
f1(x) ≡
{
0 if x ∼ (y1, x2) for all y1 ≥ x1,
1 otherwise.
f2(x) ≡
{
0 if x ∼ (x1, y2) for all y2 ≥ x2,
1 otherwise.
The function f1(x) captures irrelevance of good 1 at bundle x. Similarly, the function
f2(x) captures irrelevance of good 2 at bundle x. Observation 2 shows that if good i is
irrelevant at x = (x1, x2), then it continues to remain so for all bundles where quantity
of good j is increased keeping xi unchanged. This is immediate. Observation 2 also
shows that the converse is true which is proved using continuity of the preference.
Observation 2 (i) f2(x) = 0 ⇔ f2(x1, y2) = 0 for all y2 > x2 and (ii) f1(x) = 0 ⇔
f1(y1, x2) = 0 for all y1 > x1.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Let Ai ⊆ Xi be the set of all elements xi for which
there exists a bundle involving xi at which good j is irrelevant, that is, Ai := {xi ∈
Xi|fj(x) = 0 for some xj ∈ Xj}. Let Bi(⊆ X) be the set of all bundles at which good
j is irrelevant, that is, Bi := {x ∈ X|fj(x) = 0}. We conclude from Observation 2 that
for every xi ∈ Ai, ∃ αi(xi) ∈ Xj = R+ such that
fj(x) =
{
0 if xj ≥ αi(xi),
1 otherwise.
(1)
It follows from (1) that Bi = {x ∈ X|xi ∈ Ai, xj ≥ αi(xi)}. For xi ∈ Ai, let Bi(xi) be
the set of all bundles involving xi at which good j is irrelevant, that is, Bi(xi) := {y ∈
X|yi = xi, yj ≥ αi(xi)}. It is immediate thatBi = ∪xi∈AiBi(xi). For any xi ∈ Xi, define
the set of all bundles involving xi as Mi(xi) := {y ∈ X|yi = xi, yj ∈ Xj}. Observe that
for any xi ∈ Ai, the set of bundles Bi(xi) ⊆ Mi(xi). Moreover Bi(xi) = Mi(xi) if and
only if αi(xi) = 0. The last equality implies that good j is irrelevant at all bundles
involving xi.
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Consider any two arbitrary bundles at both of which good j is irrelevant. The
first part of Observation 3 shows that the preference ordering of these two bundles is
completely determined by amounts of good i. The second part shows that if for any
yi < xi, good j is irrelevant at all bundles involving yi, then good j is also irrelevant
at all bundles involving xi.
Observation 3
(i) Let xi, yi ∈ Ai and yi < xi. Then x  y for any x ∈ Bi(xi) and y ∈ Bi(yi).
(ii) Let xi > 0. If Bi(yi) = Mi(yi) for all yi ∈ [0, xi), then xi ∈ Ai and Bi(xi) =
Mi(xi).
3 Axiomatization of SII preferences
We begin with some definitions which will be useful for our axiomatizations.
Definition 3 A set K ⊆ X is an unhappy set (or a U-set) if for any y 6∈ K, y  x for
every x ∈ K.
Definition 4 Bi has (i) property PU if it has a non-empty subset of positive area which
is a U -set and (ii) property PU if it does not have property PU .
Definition 5 For i = 1, 2, a set S ⊆ Bi is a maximal U-subset of Bi if (a) S is a U -set
and (b) @ T ⊆ Bi such that T is a U -set and S ⊂ T.
We characterize SII preferences using unhappy set and property PU . Axiom 1 requires
that the set of bundles at which good 2 is irrelevant satisfies property PU and there
exists at least one bundle where good 1 is irrelevant. Theorem 1 shows that this
requirement uniquely characterizes SII preferences.
Axiom 1 B1 has property PU and B2 is non-empty.
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent.
(SII1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 1.
(SII2) The preference relation % on X is a SII preference with respect to X1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 will be used to prove Theorem 1. Part (I) of Lemma 1 shows that if for
some x1 > 0, good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles involving any y1 ∈ [0, x1] then B1
satisfies property PU . Part (II) shows that the converse is also true. Moreover, if B1
satisfies PU , then it has a unique maximal U -subset S which has the property that if
x = (x1, x2) ∈ S, then (x1, 0) ∈ S and consequently good 2 is irrelevant at all bundles
involving x1. Part (III) shows that if B1 satisfies property PU , then B2 cannot.
Given Axiom 1, an immediate consequence of Lemma 1(I) is that the set T = {y ∈
X | y1 ∈ [0, x1]} ⊆ B1 is a U -set and the indifference curves in T are all parallel to the
X2 axis.
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Lemma 1 (I) If x1 > 0, [0, x1] ⊆ A1 and B1(y1) = M1(y1) for all y1 ∈ [0, x1], then
B1 has property PU .
(II) Suppose B1 has property PU .
(i) Let S ⊆ B1 be a U-set. If x ∈ S, then α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1] and
∪y1∈[0,x1]B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) ⊆ S.
(ii) B1 has a unique maximal U-subset S, which has the following properties:
Either (a) S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) or (b) S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) for some x1 ∈
(0,∞), or (c) S = ∪y1∈R+M1(y1) = R2+.
(iii) Suppose (a) or (b) of (ii) holds. Then for every x1 > x1, ∃ y1 ∈ (x1, x1)
such that either y1 /∈ A1, or y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) > 0.
(III) If B1 has property PU , then B2 must have property PU .
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove (SII1)⇒ (SII2).
Proof of subsistence property: Since B1 has property PU , by Lemma 1(II)(ii), B1 has a
unique maximal U -subset S.
Now we show that S 6= R2+. To see this, first note that since B1 has property PU ,
by Lemma 1(III), B2 has property PU . Moreover, by Axiom 1, B2 is non-empty and so
is A2. Let x2 ∈ A2, y1 > x1 ≥ α2(x2) and y2 = x2. Then x, y ∈ B2(x2), so that x ∼ y.
If S = R2+, then x, y ∈ S ⊆ B1. As x ∈ M1(x1) = B1(x1), y ∈ M1(y1) = B1(y1) and
y1 > x1, by Obs. 3(i) we have y  x, a contradiction. So we must have S 6= R2+.
From the preceding paragraph and by Lemma 1(II)(ii) we conclude that either
S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) or S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) for some x1 ∈ (0,∞). In either case, by
Obs. 3(ii) we have α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Taking Q = x1 proves part (a) of the
subsistence property. Part (I)(b) of SII preference with respect to good 1 follows from
Lemma 1(II)(iii).
Proof of weak saturation property: Since B2 is non-empty, ∃ x2 ∈ X2 and α2(x2) ≥ 0
such that good 1 is relevant at x if x1 < α2(x2) and it is irrelevant at x if x1 ≥
α2(x2). Taking Q = α2(x2) proves the weak saturation property. From continuity and
monotonicity of preference it also follows that Q = x1 ≤ Q = α2(x2) and the inequality
is strict if x2 > 0.
We now prove (SII2)⇒(SII1). We consider the SII preference with respect to good 1
and show that it satisfies Axiom 1. Observe from the subsistence property that [0, Q] ⊆
A1 and B1(x1) = M1(x1) for all x1 ∈ [0, Q]. Then by Lemma 1(I), it follows that B1 has
property PU . Next observe from the weak saturation property that {x|x1 ≥ Q} ⊆ B2
so that B2 is non-empty. This proves that Axiom 1 holds.
3.1 Robustness of the axiom
Axiom 1 requires that the set B2 (for which PU does not hold) must be non-empty.
This is useful not only to generate weak saturation, but it is also necessary for the
existence of a non-subsistence zone. Without it, a non-subsistence zone might not
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exist. Without a reference to a situation of non-subsistence, the notion of subsistence
may not be meaningful. To see this, consider the following variation of Axiom 1.
Axiom 1A B1 has property PU .
Corollary 1 The following statements are equivalent.
(S1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 1A.
(S2) For the preference relation % on X, either property (I) of Definition 2 holds, or
good 2 is irrelevant at any bundle x.
Proof: We first prove (S1)⇒ (S2). Since B1 has property PU (Axiom 1A), by Lemma
1(II)(ii), B1 has a unique maximal U -subset S. If either (a) or (b) of Lemma 1(II)(ii)
holds, then property (I) of Definition 2 holds. So suppose (c) of Lemma 1(II)(ii) holds,
i.e., S = R2+. Then A1 = R+ and α1(x1) = 0 for all x1 ∈ R+, implying that good 2 is
irrelevant at any bundle x.
To prove (S1)⇒ (S2), if property (I) of Definition 2 holds, then from the proof of
Theorem 1 it follows that B1 has property PU . Otherwise, B1 = R2+, which is itself an
U -set of positive area. So property PU holds for B1.
Recall that in property (I) of Definition 2, the subsistence zone is [0, Q] for 0 < Q <
∞, which results in a non-subsistence zone (Q,∞). The preference in S2 of Corollary
1 includes the case where Q =∞, in which case there is no non-subsistence zone with
respect to good 1, rendering the other good 2 to be irrelevant at any bundle.
4 Generalized Leontief preferences
Definition 6 The preference relation % on X is a generalized Leontief preference (or a
GL preference) if there exists an onto (surjective)5 and increasing function F : X1 → X2
with F (0) = 0 such that for any x1 ∈ X1:
(i) at any bundle (x1, F (x1)), both goods X1 and X2 are irrelevant,
(ii) good 1 is relevant at any bundle (y1, F (x1)) for y1 < x1, and
(iii) good 2 is relevant at any bundle (x1, y2) for y2 < F (x1).
Observe that since F is onto and increasing, it is also one-to-one and continuous.
The domain of the inverse function of F is X2. For the standard Leontief preference
F (x1) is a linear function.
Axiom 2 B1 ∪B2 = X.
Definition 7 Bi has (i) property PG if Ai = Xi = R+.
5A function F : X1 → X2 is an onto or a surjective function if for any x2 ∈ X2, ∃ x1 ∈ X1 such
that F (x1) = x2.
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Observe that if Bi has property PG, then for all xi ∈ Xi, the function αi(xi) is well
defined, i.e., ∃ a function αi(xi) such that Bi(xi) = {y ∈ X|yi = xi, yj ≥ αi(xi)}.
Axiom 3 For i = 1, 2, the set Bi has both properties PU and PG.
Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent.
(GL1) The preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 2 and Axiom 3.
(GL2) The preference relation % on X is a generalized Leontief preference.
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2 we will use the following lemmas. Given Axiom 2, Lemma 2
shows that if a good is irrelevant (relevant) at a bundle and its amount is decreased
(increased), then it continues to be irrelevant (relevant) at the new bundle.
Lemma 2 Suppose % satisfies Axiom 2.
(I) Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. For any xi ∈ Xi, fi(x) is non-decreasing in xj.
(II) If xi ∈ Ai, then yi ∈ Ai and αi(yi) ≤ αi(xi) for all yi ∈ [0, xi).
Since PG holds for any Bi (by Axiom 3), αi(.) is defined for any xi ∈ Xi. Lemma
3 derives properties of this function and as a consequence we get the F (.) function
specified in the definition of GL preference.
Lemma 3 Suppose the preference relation % on X satisfies Axiom 2 and Axiom 3.
The following hold for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
(I) αi(xi) > 0 for any xi > 0.
(II) αi(0) = 0.
(III) αj(αi(xi)) = xi.
(IV) αi(xi) is increasing for all xi ≥ 0.
(V) αi(xi) is an onto function from Xi to Xj, i.e., for every xj ∈ Xj, ∃ xi ∈ Xi such
that αi(xi) = xj.
Proof of Theorem 2: (L1) ⇒ (L2) By Axiom 3, for i = 1, 2, Bi has property
PG. Hence Ai = Xi and αi(xi) is well defined for all xi ∈ Xi. Note from Lemma 3
that α1(.) : X1 → X2 is an increasing and onto function with α1(0) = 0 (the same
property holds for α2(.) : X2 → X1 and α2(.) is the inverse function of α1(.)). Taking
F (x1) = α1(x1), by Lemma 3(III) it follows that (i)-(iii) of Definition 6 hold.
(L2) ⇒ (L1) Suppose the preference is generalized Leontief. Then for i = 1, 2,
Ai = Xi = R+, so property PG holds. For any x1 ∈ X1, we have α1(x1) = F (x1) and for
any x2 ∈ A2, we have α2(x2) = F−1(x2), and F (0) = 0. Hence B1(x1) = {(x1, x2)|x2 ≥
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F (x)} and B2(x2) = {(x1, x2)|x1 ≥ F−1(x2)}. So we have Bi = ∪xi∈R+Bi(xi) for
i = 1, 2, and B1 ∪B2 = X, so Axiom 2 holds.
It remains to show that Bi has property PU for i = 1, 2. If for some i = 1, 2, ∃
S ⊆ Bi such that S is a U -set of positive area, then ∃ x ∈ S such that xi > 0. By
Lemma 1(II)(i), this will imply that αi(xi) = 0 for all yi ∈ [0, xi], a contradiction since
αi(yi) > 0 for all yi > 0. This shows that Bi has property PU for i = 1, 2. Since Bi also
has property PG for i = 1, 2, we conclude that Axiom 3 holds.
4.1 Robustness of axioms
Axiom 2 and Axiom 3 have three requirements: (i) B1 ∪ B2 = X, (ii) B1, B2 both
have property PG and (iii) B1, B2 both have property PU . In each of the following
examples, only one of requirements (i)-(iii) is violated, and we see that we do not get
the generalized Leontief preference. These examples show that without all of these
three conditions, we are not guaranteed to get a Leontief preference.
Example 1 Consider the preference represented by utility function u where K > 0.
u(x1, x2) =
{
min {x1/(K − x1), x2} if x1 < K,
x2 if x1 ≥ K
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 1. For this example,
B1∪B2 = X, so Axiom 2 holds. But Axiom 3 does not hold. This is because A1 = [0, K)
and A2 = R+, so B1 does not have property PG (although both B1, B2 have property
PU). For this example, α1(.) : [0, K) → R+ is defined as α1(x1) = x1/(K − x1) and
α2(.) : R+ → R+ as α2(x2) = Kx2/(1+x2). Note that α1 is not an onto function, so we
do not get a generalized Leontief preference. We get “locally Leontief” (for x1 < K)
and saturation at x1 = K.
Example 2 Consider the preference represented by utility function u where K > 0.
u(x1, x2) =
{
x1 if x1 ≤ K,
min{x1 −K, x2} if x1 > K
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 2. For this example,
B1 ∪ B2 = X, so Axiom 2 holds. Moreover, Ai = R+ for i = 1, 2, so both B1, B2 have
property PG. However, Axiom 3 does not hold since B1 does not have property PU . The
set {(x1, x2)|x1 ∈ [0, K], x2 ∈ R+} ⊂ B1 is a U -set of positive area. For this example,
αi(.) : R+ → R+ and α1(x1) = max{x1 −K, 0}, α2(x2) = K + x2 for i = 1, 2. We do
not get a generalized Leontief preference. We get “locally Leontief” (for x1 > K) and
subsistence for x1 ≤ K.
Example 3 Consider the preference represented by the utility function
u(x1, x2) =

x2 if x2 ≤ x1/2,
(x1 + x2)/3 if x1/2 < x2 < 2x1,
x1 if x2 ≥ 2x1
Some indifference curves of this preference are drawn in Figure 3. For this example,
Bi have properties PG, PU for i = 1, 2, so Axiom 3 holds. However, B1 ∪ B2 6= X,
so Axiom 2 does not hold. For this example, αi(.) : R+ → R+ and αi(xi) = 2xi for
i = 1, 2. Here also we do not get a generalized Leontief preference.
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Appendix
Proof of Observation 1: For the first part suppose, on the contrary, Q > Q. Then
(Q, x2) ∼ (Q, x2) (by (II)) and (Q, x2) ∼ (Q, y2) for any y2 > x2 (by (I)(a)), implying
(Q, x2) ∼ (Q, y2) for any y2 > x2 which violates monotonicity. So we must have Q ≤ Q.
Let x2 > 0. If Q = Q = Q, then (Q, 0) ∼ (Q, x2) (by (I)(a)) and (Q, x2) ∼ x for all
x1 > Q (by (II)), implying (Q, 0) ∼ x for all x1 > Q which violates monotonicity. So
we must have Q < Q if x2 > 0.
For the second part note that by (II) ∃ x2 and Q such that at x, good 1 is irrelevant
if x2 ≥ Q and relevant if x1 < Q. Hence x2 ∈ A2 and α2(x2) = Q. We show that (Q,∞)
is the strong non-subsistence zone with respect to good X1. For this we have to show
that for any x1 > Q, either (a) x1 /∈ A1 or (b) x1 ∈ A1 and α1(x1) > 0.
Suppose, on the contrary, ∃ x1 > Q such that neither (a) nor (b) holds, i.e., x1 ∈ A1
and α1(x1) = 0. Then for any y2 > x2 we have x ∼ (x1, y2). But since x1 > Q, we
have x, (Q, x2) ∈ B2(x2), hence x ∼ (Q, x2). By transitivity, (x1, y2) ∼ (Q, x2), which
violates monotonicity, a contradiction.
Proof of Observation 2: We prove (i), proof of (ii) is similar. Let f2(x) = 0. Then
x ∼ (x1, y2) for y2 > x2. Hence (x1, y2) ∼ (x1, z2) for any z2 > y2 > x2, implying that
f2(x1, y2) = 0.
Conversely, let f2(x1, y2) = 0 for all y2 > x2. Then (x1, y2) ∼ (x1, z2) for all z2 >
y2 > x2. Let x
n = (x1, x2+1/n) and y
n = (x1, y2+1/n) for n = 1, 2, . . . . Then x
n ∼ yn,
and hence xn % yn for n = 1, 2, . . . . Since limn→∞ xn = x and limn→∞ yn = (x1, y2), by
continuity we have x % (x1, y2). Since y2 > x2, by Observation 1 we have (x1, y2) % x.
We then conclude that x ∼ (x1, y2) for any y2 > x2, proving that f2(x) = 0.
Proof of Observation 3: (i) Let y ∈ B1(y1). Consider any z2 > max{y2, α1(x1)}.
Then (x1, z2) ∈ B1(x1). Since x1 > y1 and z2 > y2, by monotonicity (x1, z2)  y. Since
(x1, z2) ∼ x for any x ∈ Bi(xi) the result follows from transitivity.
(ii) Consider any x2 > 0 and two sequences x
n = (x1−1/n, x2), yn = (x1−1/n, 0) for
n > 1/x1. Since yi ∈ Ai and αi(yi) = 0 for yi ∈ [0, xi), we have xn, yn ∈M1(x1−1/n) =
B1(x1 − 1/n). Hence xn ∼ yn and in particular, yn % xn. Since limn→∞ xn = x and
limn→∞ yn = (x1, 0), by continuity we have (x1, 0) % x. Since x2 > 0, by Obs. 1 we
have x % (x1, 0), implying that x ∼ (x1, 0) for any x2 > 0. This proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 1: (I) Let y1 ∈ [0, x1]. As α1(y1) = 0, we have B1(y1) = M1(y1).
Let T := ∪y1∈[0,x1)B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) ⊆ B1.
To prove that T is a U -set, first we show that x  y for any y ∈ T. Observe that
x ∈ M1(x1) = B1(x1). Let y ∈ T. Then y ∈ M1(y1) = B1(y1) for some y1 < x1. By
Obs. 3(i), we conclude that x  y.
To complete the proof we show that z  y for any z such that z1 > x1. Continuity
and monotonicity of preference imply that z % (x1, 0) for any such z. From the pre-
ceding paragraph, we have (x1, 0)  y for any y ∈ T. By transitivity, z  y for any
y ∈ T. This proves that T is an U -set. As x1 > 0, the area of T is positive. So B1 has
property PU .
(II) If B1 has property PU , then ∃ S ⊆ B1 such that S is a U -set with a positive
area. Since S has positive area, ∃ x ∈ S where x1 > 0.
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(i) Consider any x ∈ S. Since y ∼ x for all y ∈ B1(x1) and S is a U -set, we must
have B1(x1) ⊆ S.
Next observe that if α1(x1) > 0 for some x ∈ S, we can find y such that y1 = x1
and y2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). Then y /∈ B1, so we have y /∈ S. But x % y (by continuity and
monotonicity of %), which contradicts that S is a U -set. Hence for any x ∈ S, we must
have α1(x1) = 0, implying that B1(x1) = M1(x1) ⊆ S.
Now we show that if x ∈ S, then y ∈ S for any y such that y1 < x1. To see this,
consider z such that z1 = x1 and z2 > y2. Since B1(x1) = M1(x1) ⊆ S, we have z ∈ S.
By monotonicity, z  y. As S is a U -set, we must have y ∈ S.
From the preceding paragraphs we conclude that if x ∈ S, then α1(y1) = 0 for all
y1 ∈ [0, x1] and ∪y1∈[0,x1]B1(y1) = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1) ⊆ S. This proves (i).
(ii) First observe that if S, T are two subsets of B1 that are both U -sets, then either
S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S. If neither holds, then ∃ x ∈ S, y ∈ T such that x /∈ S, y /∈ T. If
x1 = y1, then y ∈ M1(x1) ⊆ S, a contradiction. So x1 6= y1. W.l.o.g., let y1 < x1. But
then from the last paragraph, we have y ∈M1(y1) ⊆ S, again a contradiction.
Therefore, if B1 has property PU , then it has a unique maximal U -subset S and
this set has positive area. From part (i) we conclude that either S = ∪y1∈[0,x1]M1(y1)
or S = ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1) for some 0 < x1 <∞, or S = ∪y1∈R+M1(y1) = R2+.
(iii) If (a) or (b) of (ii) holds, then y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]
(for (b), the result for y1 = x1 follows from Obs. 3(ii)). Suppose, on the contrary ∃
x1 > x1 where the assertion (iii) does not hold. Then for every y1 ∈ (x1, x1), we have
y1 ∈ A1 and α1(y1) = 0, so that B1(y1) = M1(y1). Let S˜∗ := ∪y1∈[0,x1)M1(y1). Then
S ⊂ S˜∗ ⊆ B1. By part (I), S˜∗ is a U -set, which contradicts (II)(ii).
(III) Suppose on the contrary both B1, B2 have property PU . Then by part (II),
for i = 1, 2, ∃ xi > 0 such that xi ∈ Ai and αi(xi) = 0. Then (x1, 0) ∼ x (since
α1(x1) = 0) and (0, x2) ∼ x ∼ (y1, x2) for any y1 > x1 (since α2(x2) = 0). This
implies (x1, 0) ∼ (y1, x2). But since y1 > x1 and x2 > 0, by monotonicity we must have
(y1, x2)  (x1, 0), a contradiction. This proves (III).
Proof of Lemma 2: W.l.o.g. take i = 1 and j = 2.
(I) We have to show that f2(y1, x2) ≤ f2(x) for all y1 < x1 and f2(y1, x2) ≥ f2(x) for
all y1 > x1. Since f2(.) equals 0 or 1, it is sufficient to show: (a) if f2(x) = 0, then
f2(y1, x2) = 0 for all y1 < x1 and (b) if f2(x) = 1, then f2(y1, x2) = 1 for all y1 > x1.
If (a) does not hold, then ∃ x and y1 < x1 such that f2(x) = 0 and f2(y1, x2) = 1,
i.e., (y1, x2) /∈ B1. By Axiom 2, we must have (y1, x2) ∈ B2, so that α2(x2) ≤ y1 < x1.
Hence (y1, x2), x ∈ B2(x2), implying (y1, x2) ∼ x. Since f2(x) = 0, we have x ∼ (x1, z2)
for any z2 > x2. By transitivity, (y1, x2) ∼ (x1, z2) which violates monotonicity, so
(a) must hold. If (b) does not hold, then ∃ z and z˜1 > z1 such that f2(z) = 1 and
f2(z˜1, z2) = 0. Taking x1 = z˜1, x2 = z2 and y1 = z1 contradicts (a). Hence (b) must
hold.
(II) If x1 ∈ A1, then ∃ α1(x1) = x2 such that f2(x1, y2) = 0 ∀ y2 ≥ x2. By Lemma 2
(I), for any y1 ∈ [0, x1), we have f2(y1, x2) = 0 ∀ y2 ≥ x2. By definition of α1(.), we
have α1(y1) ≤ x2 = α1(x1) for all y1 ∈ [0, x1).
Proof of Lemma 3: W.l.o.g., take i = 1, j = 2.
(I) Suppose on the contrary α1(x1) = 0 for some x1 > 0. Then by Lemma 2(II),
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α1(y1) = 0 for all y1 ∈ [0, x1]. Then by Lemma 1(I), B1 has property PU , contradicting
Axiom 3.
(II) Suppose on the contrary α1(0) = x2 > 0. Let y2 ∈ (0, x2). Then (0, y2) /∈ B1 (since
y2 < α1(0)) and (0, y2) /∈ B2 (since 0 < α2(y2), part (I)), i.e., y2 /∈ B1 ∪ B2, which
contradicts Axiom 2.
(III) By (II), the result clearly hold for x1 = 0, so let x1 > 0. Then α1(x1) > 0 (by (I)).
Let x2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). Then x /∈ B1, so by Axiom 2 we must have x ∈ B2, implying that
α2(x2) ≤ x1 for all x2 ∈ [0, α1(x1)). By continuity,6 we have α2(α1(x1)) ≤ x1.
Denote α1(x1) = y2 and α2(y2) = y1. If y1 < x1, then y, (x1, y2) ∈ B2(y2), so
that y ∼ (x1, y2). Let z2 > y2 = α1(x1). Then (x1, z2), (x1, y2) ∈ B1(x1), implying
(x1, z2) ∼ (x1, y2). By transitivity, y ∼ (x1, z2), a contradiction (since x1 > y1 and
z2 > x2). Hence we must have y1 ≥ x1, i.e., α2(α1(x1)) ≥ x1. From the conclusion of
the previous paragraph, we conclude that α2(α1(x1)) = x1.
(IV) Since α1(0) = 0 and α1(x1) > 0 for any x1 > 0, α1(x1) is increasing at x1 = 0.
By Lemma 2(II), α1(x1) is non-decreasing. If it is not increasing for all x1 > 0, ∃
x1 > y1 > 0 such that α1(x1) = α1(y1) = x2 > 0. By part (III), we then have
α2(x2) = α2(α1(x1)) = x1 and α2(x2) = α2(α1(y1)) = y1 < x1, a contradiction.
(V) By (II), the result holds for x2 = 0. Suppose ∃ x2 > 0 such that α1(x1) 6= x2 ∀
x1 ∈ X1. Since α1(.) is continuous and α1(0) = 0, we must have α1(x1) < x2 for all
x1 ∈ X1. By Axiom 3, B2 has property PG. Hence x2 ∈ A2 and α2(x2) is well defined.
Taking x1 = α2(x2) above, we have α1(α2(x2)) < x2, which contradicts (III).
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